Who can see what
A reference is a signed note on a public register. Here is who touches it, and what each one sees.
The three parts
- Multipassthe register, on chainone record per name per domain; nobody can edit it in place
- the registrarthe one key Multipass trustsa record counts only if this key signed it
- the namewhat you hand peoplealice.ketsuban.eth reads the record back, in any ENS client
You never write to the register yourself. You ask; the registrar checks; the registrar signs; the chain keeps the signed record. The registrar is the whole game, so where it runs is the question.
Why the registrar sits in a sealed box
To prove an account is yours, the registrar must read your login token. That token lists every account you ever linked, not only the one you chose to show. Whoever holds the registrar could read all of it.
So the registrar runs inside a sealed box — a Chainlink CRE enclave, a TEE. The box reads the token, writes one record naming only the account you chose, signs it, and forgets the rest. Not even the people running this site can look inside. A masked account's view code is sealed to the same box, so nobody else can open it either.
- your browseryou sign what you want writteneverything you typed
- the enclavechecks your login tokenevery account you linked
- the enclavewrites and signs one recordonly the account you chose
- the DONcarries the signed recordthe record, nothing else
- the chainMultipass keeps itthe record, nothing else
Here, honestly: the green steps are written for the box and tested in its simulator, but this deployment has not been enrolled, so the registrar runs on this site's own server and its operator could read them. Not claimed here until it is.
One key, three places it must match
The chain expects a registrar key. The site signs with a key. View codes are sealed to a key. Same key in all three, or nothing works — and nothing can be faked.
| every domain expects | 0x8583…bbC8 |
| the attester signs as | 0x8583…bbC8 |
| a view code is sealed to | 0x8583…bbC8 |
0x8583AD4a0F59Ba45C7E201318C6F774F31f7bbC8
One key in all three: records are accepted on chain, and a view code opens nowhere else.
Nothing here is mocked: the contracts, on Sepolia
Every address this deployment writes to or reads from, on the public explorer. Open any of them and read the same records this site shows.
It has done it for real
| a public account | 0x71b7edd5… |
| one kept private | 0x6af38a23… |
The private one stores no handle at all: scrambled bytes and a lock only a view code opens. Nodes simulated, forwarder Chainlink's MockKeystoneForwarder; handler, signature, bridge and record real.
How SybilScore is counted
Fake accounts can vouch for each other all day. What they cannot do is be a real person.
- edgesevery live reference is a line, writer → subjectsigned records, nothing guessed
- seedspeople who passed a Selfie Checkthe one thing you cannot hold twice
- walktrust flows from seeds along the linesteams fill up; rings of fakes barely do
- ranktrust divided by connectionscollecting connections earns nothing
- SybilScore0–100: a real person is 20, each reference adds up to 15 of its writer's scorea newcomer starts at 0; a ring nobody proved stays at 0
A signal beside the count and the shape, never a verdict.
How a reference is read
- the words31 bytes somebody signedalways shown as written
- the councilthree AI models read them, oncethe words are data, never instructions
- polaritycritical … supportive, and one sentence whysame words, same reading
- provisionaluntil real peers have judgedno council configured → shown unread
It reads sentences, not people.
Outside the box, on purpose
- Your World ID proof — has no secret of yours in it; World says whether it holds.
- Reference letters — kept on this site; only their fingerprint is on chain, forever.
- Who may read a masked account — kept on this site; opens only inside the box.
What this deployment says is wrong with it
- the Multipass owner is the relayer key (0xF0121f93b1a1bAd73AdDC316B57684bD93D3254e): the key that signs transactions can also delete any record, so one compromise removes references this deployment calls permanent. It owns Multipass because provisioning a vouch domain is an owner call; the fix is a separate owner signer for that call, then transfer ownership to a key that signs nothing else